US Savers Turned the Screw in 1Q

• US Cyclical Factors including ROC and Real Labour Productivity Remain Sharply Positive
• But Deleveraging Accelerated Again in 1Q, Pushing Up Private Sector Savings Surplus , and and Pushing Down Loan / Deposit Ratios
• Renewed deleveraging is anomalous, and is not reflected in asset prices or straightforward risk measurements
• Renewed deleveraging is anomalous at a time of exceptionally bad bond-market value
• So the Growth Risk for the Rest of the Year Remains on the Upside

We now have quarterly GDP numbers for the world's major economies, so it's time to start tracking movements in the fundamental ratios which structure the world's business cycles, starting with the US.

Our view based on these ratios for 4Q11 were (in this piece)as follows: “. . . by our estimate returns on capital are around their highest since 2000 and are still rising, which will continue to foster investment spending; labour productivity continues to grow (adjusted for changes in capital stock), which will underpin the slowly- accelerating addition of jobs; and, most importantly, we believe that the net develeraging of the economy which started in 2008 is now complete. We do not expect significant re-leveraging to take place this year, but the mere fact that deleveraging is no longer the key dynamic will shift the economy out of its modest 2.4% annualized growth trend which it has sustained since the end of the recession in 2009 and towards a 3%+ rate.”

How much of that is still right? The good news is that returns on both capital and labour continue to rise, at an accelerating pace – the best underlying news for a sustained business cycle upswing.

ROC is still climbing, and this continues to fire major capital investment spending: in nominal terms, total fixed capital investment jumped at an annualized pace of 20.8% during 1Q. In real terms, private capital spending rose only a miserable 1.4% annualized - but there seems to be an unaccounted seasonal factor at work depressing the 1Q investment numbers, since this was the best 1Q reading since 2006. Overall, nominal capital stock is probably growing around 1.2% a year – still less than half the c4% yoy nominal GDP growth, so we should expect ROCs to continue to rise along with asset turns.

Real output per worker, adjusted for capital stock per worker, also accelerated mildly to 3% during 1Q, an inflection from from 2.8% in 4Q10 which should be enough to sustain improvements in the labour market. 

As far as margins are concerned, the US international terms of trade have held steady since they bottomed out in December 2011: since then export prices have risen 2%, whilst import prices have risen just 1%.

All of this suggests the US cycle should be in buoyant good health. But it doesn't seem to be: the 2.2% annualized GDP growth recorded in 1Q was lower than I expected, and a retreat from the 3% of 4Q11. And there's probably more on the way, since the GDP data disappointed even before the 'soft patch' began to show up in the data for April and May's economy.

I have previously explained the origins of that 'soft patch' in the industrial sector, using changes in momentum of output, domestic demand, inventory and export demand. I think that analysis is both correct and useful . . . . but also incomplete.

For the big disappointment of 1Q is that deleveraging had not stopped, as I expected. Rather, it re-started and re-intensified – and it is that which so far is the decisive factor in the US recovery. One can capture this by two counts. First, the private sector savings surplus jumped to 8% of GDP in 1Q from 5.2% in 4Q11. There are strong seasonal factors at work, but nevertheless, that jump was sufficient to push up the 12m ratio to 4.7% of GDP, from 3.8% during calendar 2011. This is the only quarter since 2009 that the PSSS has risen significantly. 

Second, the same story is written in the banking system's balance sheet: during 4Q11 banks' loan to deposit ratio stood at 81.8%, and was rising gently, having seemingly bottomed out in 3Q11. But by early May 2011, the ratio had fallen again, to 80.8%, with deposits rising US$153bn since the beginning of the year, compared to a rise of only US$70bn for loans. 

Awaiting Eurogeddon, it may seem obvious that caution must reassert itself. But, of course, the timing doesn't fit. More, reawakened caution was not obviously reflected – and frankly, still is not obviously reflected – in US financial asset prices. During 1Q, most measurements of risk were in retreat: 5y bank CDS rates declined to average 201bps in 1Q12 from 252bps in 4Q11, whilst the capital risk premium on 10yr Treasuries (spread between 10yrs and 10yr TIPs) widened modestly in a way which usually signals improving risk tolerance.

More, US Treasuries became ever more expensive relative to the fair value you would expect in an economy growing 2.2%, CPI inflation of 2.82% and a Fed Funds target of 25bps. Historically, as the chart below shows, when Treasuries represent such astoundingly bad value, one expects Private Sector Savings Surpluses to start to dwindle. But rather, the opposite happened.

In conclusion, we really do not know what has provoked re-invigorated deleveraging in the US during 1Q12 - for the time being it remains anomalous. Unless or until a workable explanation is found, we should expect precisely that it will be an anomaly, which is likely to be corrected in the coming quarters. If so, the upside risks to US growth during the rest of 2012 continue to look greater than the downside risks.  

One Day the EU Will Apply to Join Turkey

I've spent the last couple of months an investment bank in Bahrain which had (past tense) an ambition to ally the surplus capital of the Gulf region to the financing opportunities presented by the historic emergence of Turkey and its near neighbours. To my mind, that was (and is) a hugely inviting prospect. Istanbul is one of the few cities that can claim to be the centre of the world, and right now hosts an alliance of demographics and growth that I remember from the great Asian emerging markets of 20 years ago. The long and short of it is that Turkey is a country of 74+mn, with a median age of 28.5 years, a per capita income averaging around US$10,300. Over the last decade its real GDP growth rate has averaged 5.3%, but it's been a rough old journey, with a standard deviation of 4.4%.

Growth, opportunity and volatility – what's not to like for an emerging market investor?

Right now, it looks as if 2012 will be another rocky year, with investors needing to take a view on how far Turkey overheated last year, how quickly it is rebalancing its economy between domestic demand and exports, and how much appetite world markets have to keep financing Turkey's investment spending. My sort of questions, in other words. (Incidentally, I expect the usual suspects will markedly underestimate the capital appetite for Turkish risk at this point: the key datapoint being the 110% jump in FDI – the world's stickiest money – last year).

My starting point is, as usual, to run the Flow Essentials charts to get to the underlying ratios Turkey's economic growth and financing depends on. Start with estimated growth of capital stock and the direction of ROC. My assumption is that when you've got a rapidly expanding banking system (loan growth of 42.3% last year) you must have significant misallocation of resources, disguised temporarily by inflation (up 6.5% on average in 2011, and rising sharply, to 10.6% YoY in January). But even using deflated numbers, on my count capital stock is growing around 8.6% pa (or 16.5% nominal), but ROC was no worse than flat last year.

And this was borne out by the monetary velocity reading, which again was no worse than flat.

This was a genuine surprise: the expected misallocation should have shown up far more starkly on these charts.

Still, leverage must have been rising sharply, and banking data tells us that banks' loan/deposit ratio rose from around 80% at the beginning of the year to 89% by the end of the year, and that this had been financed at least in part by an increase in foreign liabilities from a net US$16.74bn at the beginning of the year to around US$20.4bn by the end of the year. But once again, one would have expected the rise in leverage of the banking system, and is escalating exposure to the jitters of its foreign liabilities to be more extreme. Run the numbers, and it turns out that only 9% of the rise in the loan book was funded by the net increase in foreign liabilities – slightly less than the 11.2% that was funded by banks' running down their holdings of domestic securities.

But in the end, we cannot escape the fact that even if Turkey's rapid 2011 growth has been driven by rather less inefficient resource allocation than we had expected, and even if the financing of the growth was rather less reckless than it might have been, Turkey's growth was still powered by a major private sector savings deficit. In fact, I estimate that that deficit came to 8.7% of GDP in 2011.

And here is the rub: judging how far and how fast that savings deficit is being corrected this year is surely the key to potentially one of the most exciting turnaround stories of the year.

Yesterday Turkey reported that it ran a current account deficit of US$5,998mn in January, slightly down from US$6,565 mn in December, and US$6,022mn in January 2011. Nonetheless, this was taken as a slight disappointment (consensus had expected a deficit of only US$5,500mn for the month), because the monthly improvement was only approximately half the improvement of the trade balance. The surplus on 'invisibles' amounted to only just over US$1bn, which was 24.1% less than in January 2011. Part of the reason for this, no doubt, was the stalling of the tourism trade: tourist arrivals rose only 0.6% YoY in January – no doubt reflecting Europe's straitened economic circumstances.

So far so gloomy. However, what matters for Turkish financial markets right now is the extent to which, and the pace at which, it winds back the private sector savings deficit which ballooned to around 9% of GDP last year. Movements in the current account are a crucial part of this calculation, and here the news is distinctly better.

In nominal terms, the 3m private sector savings deficit hit bottom in May 2011 at Tkl 33.99bn, and has since moderated. That progress was continued during January. In the three months to end-Jan, the PSSD improved to Tkl 26.57bn – only Tkl 2.38bn above where the balance was the same period last year.

Private sector savings surpluses and deficits usually have a distinctive seasonal pattern (as do current account balances, and government fiscal balances) so we can also assess how current changes in private sector savings flows compare to 'normal' conditions. And, as the second chart shows, when judged on this basis, Turkey's private sector savings cashflow position continues to improve, with the pace of improvement having picked up noticeably in the three months to both December and January.