Good News First: Margins Survive Sales rose 2.9% yoy against a fairly easy base of comparison, with the quarterly result just as disappointing in 3Q as in 2Q: in other words, the topline continued to suffer from the after effects of the sales tax rise. Still, operating profits rose 3.8% yoy, which pushed up the 12m OPM to 4.07%, the highest since the immediate aftermath of the Bubble in 1991.
How has that rise in 12m margins been achieved, and is it sustainable? For the quarter, the cost of goods ratio rose 0.8pps to 78% in 3Q, and rose 0.3pps to 77.7% in the 12m to Sept. For the quarter, this was only partly offset by a 0.4pp fall in SG&A/Sales to 18.3%, but on a 12m basis, SG&A fell 0.8pps to 18.3%. The main driver behind that improvement was personnel expenses, which rose only 1.7% yoy in 3Q (compared to the sales rise of 2.9%). For the quarter, personnel expenses/sales fell 0.4ps to 12.6% of sales, and on a 12m basis, they fell 0.6pps to 12.5%. More directly, sales per employee rose 7.1% yoy and 9.6% on a 12ma, whilst expenses per employee rose only 2.2% yoy and 4.3% on a 12ma. The sales/expenses multiple per employee rose to 7.98x in 3Q14, which was the highest since 4Q10, and on a 12m basis it rose to 7.91x, the highest since 2Q11.
There is no reason to think that corporate Japan
will be content to allow this multiple to slip – certainly not
before it reaches the levels around 8.3x that was achieved
immediately prior to the financial crisis.
And Now The Less-Good News But despite the ability to maintain margins,
corporate Japan has not entirely managed to escape the tax-generated
headwinds which slowed the economy. After all, it is easier to patrol
margins in these circumstances than to restructure the balance sheet
in the face of a probably transient shock to the top line. Corporate
Japan's asset turns (sales/total assets) were hit hard in 2Q,
slipping to an annualized 0.91 from 1 in 1Q, and although they edged
up to 0.93 in 3Q, this has not been enough to rescue the 12m
multiple, which fell marginally to 0.939. This is as low as this
multiple has been (and the same as in 4Q09), but it is not impossible
it will fall further in 4Q.
In addition, corporate Japan's ultra-conservative
attitude towards the balance sheet needed no adjustment to the
disappointment in 3Q topline growth: net debt fell by Y2.92tr qoq,
and cash on hand rose by Y4.375tr, cutting the net debt/equity
ratio by 1.2pps to 53.5%, another record post-Bubble low.
The result is that for both ROA and ROE, the margin gains being squeezed out of the workforce were lost this quarter by the fall in asset turns and leverage.
Nevertheless, whilst the recovery in ROA and ROE
has stalled, cashflows remain very strong: investment in plant and
equipment came to Y9.45tr in 3Q, up 5.5% yoy, whilst net debt fell
Y2.92tr during the quarter. In all, then, that amounts to Y12.36tr
of cashflow achieved in 3Q, up 55.5% yoy and up 64.1% on a 12m basis.
The problem is that nothing in these balance
sheets suggest any increased willingness to deploy that cash back
into the economy. Although investment spending over the last 12m is
up 5.2%, this amounts to only 77% of cashflow: meanwhile, amount of
cash on the balance sheet amounted to 11% of total assets, the
highest since the immediate aftermath of the Bubble. And it's still
climbing. Meanwhile, the Y9.45tr in 3Q capex is actually slightly
less than the Y10.715tr claimed in depreciation expenses: unless
Japan's depreciation schedules are unrealistically aggressive (but
they are!), this implies an actual shrinkage of the the capital stock
of corporate Japan. And 3Q was not exceptional in this regard: over
the last 12 months, capex spending was only 2% more than the
depreciation expenses booked!